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Robert Morkot
THE, EGYPTIAN E,MPIRE, IN NUBIA IN THE LATE,
BRONZE AGE ( t .1550- l  070 B CE)
Introdu,ct'ion: sef-def,nit'ion an,d. the ,irnperi.ol con.cept in
Egypt
There can be litde doubt rhat the Egyptian pharaohs and the elite of the New
I(ngdom viewed themselves as rulers of an empire. This universal rule is clearly
expressed in royal imagerv and terminology (Grimal f986). The pharaoh is
styied as the "Ruler of all that sun encircles" and from the mid-f 8th Dynasry the
tides "I(ing of kings" and "Ruler of the rulers," with the variants "Lion" or "Sun
of the Rulers," emphasize pharaoh's preeminence among other monarchs. The
imagery of krngship is of the all-conquering heroic ruler subjecting a1l foreign
lands. The lcing in human form smites his enemies. Or, as the celestial conqueror
in the form of the sphinx, he tramples them under foot. In the reigns of
Amenhotep III and Akhenaten this imagery was exrended to the king's wife who
became the conqueror of the female enemies of Egypt, appearing like her
husband in both human and sphinx forms (Morkot 1986). The appropriate ter-
minology also appeared; Queen Tiye became "Mistress of all women" and
"Great of terror in the foreign lands." Empire, for the Egyptians, equals force -
"all lands are under his feet." This metaphor is graphically expressed in the royal
footstools and painted paths decorated \Mith images of bound foreign rulers,
crushed by pharaoh as he walked or sar.
This imagery and terminologv indicates that the Egyptian attirude to their
empire was universally applied irrespective of the peoples or countries. Their
response to their subjects was not distinguished in racial terms; all were foreign.
Practically, however) there is evidence that the E,gyptians did have d.ifferent
responses to the control, integration, and administration of African and Asian
regions. The Egyptian response to Nubia differed from the response to Asia for
a number of reasons) both historic and geographic. In this chapter, however, I
will limit my discussion to the relations berween Egypt and Nubia. 227
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Chnng'irg 'iruterrpretnt'ions 0f the Egypt'inru erwpire 'in ]{wbin
ln L964, Adams summarrzed the then generaily accepted view of Egypt's rela-
uonship with Nubia during the Late Bronze Ag. (New lCngdom, c.1550-1070
B CE), and ofTered his own interpretation based upon preliminary results of the
UNESCO campuigtt in Nubia. The UNESCO camp*ig., associated with con-
struction of the Aswan dam, produced a vast amount of new archaeological and
e pigraphic material, not all ofwhich has yet be en published or svnthesi zed. lVhile
rejecting many of the older interpretations that were base d on prejudiciai and
problematic premises, Adams' (L964, 1977) characterization of the Egyptian
empire still perpetuated a number of views established at the beginning of the
twentieth century.
A significant change in E,gyptological attitudes to the Egyptian empire in
Nubia is found in the conference papers and syntheses of the late L970s and earlv
1980s (..g., I(emp 1978; Frandsen 1979; Leclant I9B0; O'Connor in Trigger
et al. f 9B3; Israelit-Groll 1983). These r,vorks embraced not only new material,
but also new approaches within archaeology. All were rooted in the evidence,
and not in theory building. They were) nevertheless, informed by contemporary
theoretical approaches to imperialism. Prominent features of these studies
include the emphasis on the role of ideology in imperial expansion, and a ques-
tioning of the role of trade and the assumption that empires were necessarily eco-
nomic exploiters. I(emp, Frandsen) and O'Connor particularly emphasize the
inte gration of local elites into Egyptian imperial administration and argue againsr
the direct exploitation model.
More recentlg S. T. Smith (1991)has been among the few Egyptologists to
discuss theoretical models of imperialism. Finding the arguments in Eisenstadt
(L979) to be somewhat overgeneralized, he detects more relevance fbr Egyptian
activities in Nubia in the model proposed by Horvath (L972) and Bartel (1980,
t9B5) and the specific applications of D'Altroy and Earle (f985) and Alcock
( f 9B9 ). Building on this theoretical discussion, Smith (L995 ) went on to publish
the material from the UNESCO excavations at Askut, and ofTered a model for
the economics and ideology of imperialism in Nubia. A further result of the
UNESCO Nubian camptgn of the 1960s was the publication of the tornbs of
indigenous Nubian princes of the l8th Dynasty at Debeira (Srive-Soderbergh
1967-8; Sdve-Soderbergh and Troy L99l) and Toshka (Simpson 1963). IGmp,
O'Connor, and Frandsen had already emphasized the role of these individuals,
but Sdve-Sdderbergh and Trov (I99I ) provided an important reappraisal in the
light of the new material.
With the exception of these studies, the period of the Egyptian New ICngdom
occupation of Nubia has been rather ne glected in recent years. This is due in
large part to an understandable change in attitudes within Nubian srudies itself,
laying much greater emphasis on indigenous phases rather than on Egyptian
"colonial" monuments.
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itrIv approach (Morkor 1994, outlined in Morkot I}BT) examines the
Egvptran domination of Nubia in the New I(ngdom through various rhemes:
mrlitarg politrcal geography (Morkot I991b), administrarion, economics
(Nlorkot 1995a), and ideology. In considering all of these separate issues, I have
emphasized the chronological framer,vork. That is, New Icngdom Egyptian rule
in Nubia lasted for close to 500 years. Clearly there must have been considerable
changes over that period. One specific area that I wished to ad"dress was the .,col-
lapse" or end of imperial rule and its aftermath.
The older interpretation of Egyptian imperialism in Nubia saw Egypt as an
active-progressive center that subordinated and transformed a passive an4 back-
ward periphery. With the end of Egyptian involvemenr, Nubia the n .,reverted .,,
This view has been challenged and modified by u number of recent writers, bur
the idea of reversion to some form of nomadic or "tribal" sociery has persisted.
In contrast, I view the I(ushite I(ngdom that (eventually) came ro dominate
Egypt as the "25th Dynasty" (c. 740-656 B CE) as a "successor srate,,' rhe
development of which is inextricable from the imperial sysrem of the Egyptian
New I(ngdom (see belor,v). Indeed, to view this successor as irurued..iatelyfilling
the power vacuum left by Egyptian withdrawal, if not actually being responsible
for that withdrawal, itself necessitates a radical revision of our int"rpretation of
the limits of Egyptian control.
Earlier archaeologists proposed that the period of Egyptian rule was marked
by n decline in population in the late New l(ngdom, and argued that the en4 of
the period was marked by hydraulic crisis that contributed to imperial collapse.
Aithough this interpretation is now generally rejecte d) many of the conclusions
that derive from it are stili accepted. The idea that the Egyptians simply left
Nubia rn c. 1070 BCE and that nothing happened until the Kushite I6ngdom
appeared some 300 years later is inherently unlikely. This is not an interprerarion
suggested by even the most cursory glance at other postimperial and post-
coionial societies. Working from the premises that' (r) there was no reason ro
accePt that there was a major depopulation of Nubia during the Late New
Kingdom, and (2) there was no hiatus in either archaeology or history, led me
to consider, among other alternatives, that there was indeed, a flaw in our chron-
ological interpretation (lames et al. IggL). I still feel that this highly conrrover-
sial alternative is worth considering.
Other scholars have also challenged convenrional interpretations. Bruce
Williams (1980) ofTered a reinterpretation of the post-New Kingdom archaeol-
ogy of Lower Nubia. And David O'Conn or (1987 
,IggI) questioned the loca-
tion of some Nubian territories. This has led ro a rerhinking of how far the
Egyptians expanded and campaigned in Nubia, and Nubian responses ro
Egyptian imperial expansion. S. T. Smith (199 I:94 n.I2) also rejects rhe depop-
ulation theory.
The most significant questions that arise from this questioning of traditional
interpretations are :
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I Was the administration of Nubia entirelv controlled bv "colonial',
Egyptiansf
lVere there large numbers of Egyptian settlers in Nubiai
Was the Egyptian economic exploitation of Nubia one-sided piunderf
Was the Egyptian response to Nubia firndamentaliy different from her
response to Asiai
Did a hydraulic crisis cause the population of Nubia to decline rapidly
from the later-l8th Dynasty onwards resulting in an almost depopu-
lated country by the end of the viceregai periodf
Egyptinn policy 'in l{ubin in, the Old a,nd Mi,ddle lQngdorn
The E,gyptian New Kingdom presence in Nubia cannot be considered i,n vacwo,
but has to be seen as the third phase of a complex relationship that stretched back
for some 2000-plus years.
Pending the publication of the material from the Old I(ngdom Town site at
Buhen (being undertaken by David O'Connor), which will certainly require
some reevaluation of our current understandings, th. relationship between Egypt
and Nubia in the Egyptian Eaf-Dynastrc/Old I(ngdom may be summarized as
follows. In the late Predynastic phase, equivalent to the Nubian A-Group (c.
5000-3000 BCE; Trigger's Early Nubian, Adams' A-Horizon) there vvere
strong trading contacts between the two regions. These have recendy been sum-
marized by H. S. Smith (1991). The radical hypothesis of Bruce Williams (1980)
- that the pharaonic monarchy first appeared in Nubia during this period - has
been rejected by the majoriry of both Egyptologists and Nubian archaeologists.
There is now more material from Abydos that predates the Nubian material
Williams worked with. Indeed, the archaeological material from Abydos,
Hierakonpolis, and other sites further north is forcing a complete reevaluation of
the emergence of the pharaonic state. Nevertheless, Williams was certainly jus-
tified in revising the earlier model that saw A-Group society as non-hierarchical.
It is clear that during the period of state formation in Egypt, Nubia was under-
going a similar process. This was probably due in large part to increased economic
contacts between the two regions. By the time of the unification of Egypt there
were three principal powers in Lower Nubia - and th.y may have been united
into one state based at Qustul. However) we have no documentary evidence to
illuminate this, and the evidence at present is derived from the cemetery sites of
Seyala (H. S. Smith L994) and Qustul (B. B. Williams 1986, 1992).
Egyptian military expansion into Nubia in the lst Dynasty seems to have been
an attempt to suppress a powerfirl southern neighbor (H. S. Smith I99f).
I{owever, there is no evidence of what motivated Egyptian actions. Was Nubia
somehow involved militarily in Egyptl There is a consensus among archaeolo-
gists working in Nubia that the indigenous population was driven out by the
Egyptian campaigns and that for the major part of the Egyptian Old l(ngdom
the Nubians adopted a nomadic lifestyle in the surrounding semi-desert regions.
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Table 9.L Cornpnrntipe chronology: Egypt and, lr[ubia
The sffong cultural similarities with people who appear in Nubia in the late Old
Kingdom suggest that th.y may have regained control of the Lower Nubian Nile
valley in the Sth Dynasty - perhaps forced back into the valley by increasing des-
iccation of surrounding regions. It is also possible rhat while adoptin g a sern,i-
nomadic lifestyle th"y had continued to come into the Nile valley seasonally to
raise crops.
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The Egyptian presence in Nubia during the Old I(ngdom seems to have been
sporadic rather than constant. S. T. Smith (1991: B3) characterizes this phase as
an example of l{orvath and Bartel's "Eradication Imperialism." Although there
is evidence of direct exploitation of resources) notably the diorite from the quar-
ries at Toshka to the west of Buhen, the full e conomic importance of Nubia to
Egypt is still unclear. It might be assumed that some gold and semi-precious
stones were acquired from the deserts and presumably from trade with Upper
Nubia, and, through Upper Nubia, with the central Sudan. The excavarions ar
I(erma are now producing material from the so-called pre-I(erma phases, and it
is likely that the center was already emerging as a point of contact betr,veen the
Egyptians and Nubians.
The activities of the Middle i(ngdom pharaohs began with military forays in
the llth Dynasty.Again Nubia seems to have been divided into multiple states
with powerful rulers, some of whom may have already adopted pharaonic sryle
(Morkot 1999a). Middle I(ngdom military activities were prolonged, conrinu-
ing into the reigns of l-2th Dynasty rulers Amenemhat I and Senusrer I. One
official's rock inscription records that he had been campaigrirg in Nubia for
twenry years on behalf of pharaoh. As in the Old Kingdom, there seems to have
been an attempt to completely subjugate the population, although this rime not
to force them out of the country. References to crop destruction, fblling of trees,
andrazing ofvillages indicate the intensiw of the campaigns. The Egyptians built
a series of massive fortresses - but these were for control of the Nile traffic. Most
are siruated around the 2nd Cataract, with Buhen the major depot at rhe north-
ern end (see Fig. 9.f ). Two other major forts controlled the Nile valley in Lor,ver
Nubia.
The extent to which the Egyptians integrated the Nubian population in this
phase is still questionable . There is archaeological evidence for a flourishing local
culture, and conventional interpretations assume that the Egyptians were not
interested in the indigenous population. Instead, the focus of attenrion was rhe
trade with the south. This phase can be seen as an example of Horvath and
Bartel's "Equilibrium Imperialism" (S. T. Smith I99I : 8 3 ). It ended with
Egypt's withdrawal. Having initially supported the I(erma "stare" as a uading
partner, perhaps militarily, I(erma's power grew to such an extent that it was able
to take over Lower Nubia (a cause or result of Egyptian withdrawal).
Mil'itnry expa.ns,ion ,into l{wb,in in, the ldew I(ingdorn(r. 1555-1070 BCE)
The process of New I(ngdom Egyptian military expansion into Nubia has been
reasonably clear for a long time from the evidence of hieroglyphic inscriptions
and graffiti. Relatively litde new material has come to light in recent years, and
that which has has tended to add detail rather than radically alter our reconstruc-
tion of events. Nevertheless, the schol"tly literature still tends to underempha-
size the time and efTort required for the Egyptians to gain control of Nubia as
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far as the 4th Nile Cataract. Egyptian rule in Nubia during the Late Bronze Ag.
(New I(ngdom) lasted altogether for about 500 vears, of which the phase of
expansion amounted to a firll hundred years. (Note: in the following d-iscussion,
I follow conventional chronological terminology; d.ates written as + "150," for
example) are those of Egyptian domination calculated from year I of the reien
of  Kamose,  r .  1555 BCE).
It was with the three military campaigns during the co=reign of Hatshepsur
and Thutmose III ( + 63-84) that Egyptian dominarion as far as the 3rd Cararacr
was assured and some significant control was gained over the region as far as the
4th Cataract. Thutmose III did not return to Nubia for rwenty-five years
(+ 109), when he sailed through the Dongola Reach as far as Gebel Barkal. He
claims to have been the first pharaoh to do this - and there is no evidence to the
contrary. This year therefore marks the establishment of, the Egyprian frontier at
the 4th Cataract. Ivhlitary actions following his reign are relatively few and appear
to have been directed principally against desert gold-mining regions. A period
9.1 Lower ]{ubin.
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of apparent peace fbilow.d (+ 1I6-212), in u,'hich d-iplomacv rather rhal u,ar
dominated Egvptian fbreign policy and Nubian "lumries" were the mainsta\r of
international gift-erchange. From the reign of Horemheb (+215-2+6) on, a
difTerent situation seems to have prevailed in military activities in the south.
Although much of the Nile valley appears to have remained peacefui, the regions
on the southern frontier were increasingly dominated by the "rebellions', of
I rem (O'Connor 1987).
The end of Egyptian rule in Nubia is still rather obscure. The evidence sug-
gests that the viceregal government continued to operate normally until after the
reign of Ramesses VI (+ 397403). At some point in the late 20th Dynasry, pos-
sibly as late as the reign of Ramesses XI (+438--468), the southern province of
I(ush (located between the 2nd and 3rd Cataracts) was abandoned. The frontier
was redrawn at the 2nd Cataract. Evidence from the adminisuative capital of
I(ush - Amara West - suggesls that it was systematicalll. closed dor,vn. This in itself
implies that either events in E,gypt or the emergence of an indigenous power in
southern Nubia were causing problems. The middle years of Ramesses XI saw
the viceroy active in Egypt itself. The last decade of his reign witnessed civil war
and campaigns ngn'inst the viceroy who was still in control of Lower Nubia and
the provincial capital, Aniba.
The New l(ngdom phase of imperial expansion in Nubia, closely paralleled in
western Asia, differed from previous expansions in several ways. First, there was
a clear policy of integrating the people and using them within the administration
rather then removing them or (apparently) ignoring them. Second, the time
factor is important. Including the period of expansion, New I(ngdom Egyptian
presence in Nubia lasted for nearly 500 years, as opposed to the intermittent
presence during the Old I(ngdom (400 years) and the confined occupation of
the Middle IGngdom (260 years). Third, E,gyptian ideology also reflects a difTer-
ent attitude. From the mid-l8th Dynasty on) a distinctly imperial terminology
deveioped. This certainly grew out of the traditional tides and images of pha-
raohs, but included new elements that acknowledged the superiority of the
pharaoh among other rulers: that is, "I(ing of Kings" and "Ruler of the Rulers"
(Grimal 1986; also see Lorton L974 who gives different renderings of these
titles).
P o lit'i c n I g e og r aP h y fr.n d n dno'ini,str nt,iy 0 str/ u ctrl,r e s
The major distinction between the model I have proposed (Morkot 1987,
I99lb, L994) and the conventional Egyptological model of imperialism con-
cerns the limits of Egyptian control in Nubia, both geographical and inte grative.
Most studies have assumed that the regions of Nubia direcdy integrate d into
the viceregal administration extended from the lst Cataract (immediately south
of Aswan) to the 4th Cataract. This region was divided into rwo provinces,
Wawat and Kush. Wawat, in Lower Nubia, extended from the lst to rhe Znd
Cataract, and l(ush, from the 2nd to the 4th Cataract. In contrast. I have pre-
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senred (Nlorkot 1991b) a verv difTerent model for the region south of the 2nd
Cataract. I argue that the viceregai domain of I(ush extended only from the 2nd
ro rhe 3rd Cataract. The region south, between the 3rd and 4th Cataracts) \,vas
a frontie r zone that came under the control of the "Overseers of Southern
Foreign Lands." It was also called l(ush. The major E,gyptian foundations in
Kush lie to the north of the 3rd Cataract. They are the fortress of Sai and the
temple-towns of Soleb, Sedeinga, Sesebi, and Amara West (see Fig.9.2). South
of the 3rd Cataract) New ICngdom temples have been identifie d only at l(awa
and at Gebel Barkal. Recent excavations have also identified New I(ngdom
material at I(erma.
fu'guments against my model (..g., Kemp l-99l) have emphasized that there
has been relativeiy litde survey and excavation in the 3rd-4th Cataract region.
Therefore, the fact that there have been few New IGngdom sites identrfied does
not mean that th.y were not there; they simply ar,vait discovery. However, this
ignores my key argument concerning the nature of the sites north of the 3rd
Cataract (see below). Iftmp (I972a, L972b, L97B) seems to agree with a gen-
erally held view of New I(ngdom population growth. He views settlement in
this region as essentially expansionist; the number of towns increased over time.
In consequence) he concludes that the distribution of the towns was not com-
mensurate with the agricultural potentiai of the region. In marked contrast, I
have emphasized the distinctive nature and short duration of the sites in this
region.
The building of new temple-towns in the Abri-Delgo Reach of Upper Nubia
began about 150 years after E,gyptian reoccupation of Nubia. This part of Upper
Nubia had been first occupied in the war against I(erma and was continuously
occupied, with a major fortress at Sai. The region was fertile, although not so
productive as areas south of the 3rd Cataract, and was within a gold-producing
region (although its extent remains unclear). Whether the new temple-towns
were built to accommodate an expandirg population from Eglpt remains ques-
tionable, although with the expansion of the Lower Nubian system, land may
have been needed to settle if not Egyptian "colonists," then Nubians or Egypto-
Nubians. Having made a decision to absorb this area, th. administration created
setdements that would establish an inteqrated local economv. something a for-
tress did not do.
Expansion in the Abri-Delgo Reach follows closely upon what seems to have
been a conscious reor gailzatton of the administration ofNubia sometime during
the reign of Amenhotep II (+ 116-139) or Thutmose fV (+ I39-148). The
initial development of the imperial administration seems to have rapidly followed
military expansion, creating offices, etc., as circumstances dictated. The subse -
quent period of consolidation and, apparently, relative peace saw a reorganiza-
tion directly paralleling that of the Egyptian administration. There were two
provinces headed by the viceroy, each with its own deputy (i,d,nu). The religious
institutions and the milirary had their oWn heads.
The continued building works within the Abri-Delgo region suggest that
- I
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9.2 Upper I:{wbin.
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poiitical and ideologrcal factors, rather than purely agricultural concerns) were
important in its development. A parallel may be noted to the situation in the
peripheries of the Late Assvrian Empire , discussed by Liverani (1979, 1990:
L35J3), r,vith the duw of the virtuous king to extend cosmic order, irrigate arid
land, and build towns. The cultic emphases and associations with rebirth evident
in the Nubian temples might go some way to support the interpretation of the
building campaigns as political and religious acts.
In sum, I see the temple-towns of the Abri-Delgo Reach not as a continuing
urban expansion into this region of Nubia, but as a series of foundations of much
more limited duration. These towns served briefly as t-he principal administrarive
centers of specific reigns and were later repiaced. As such, th"y parallel the
"Houses of millions of years" in Egypt itseif, their estates being reallocated to
nelver foundations. Of course, with estates in the viciniry of the settlements they
would not have been completely abandoned - but the official class would have
moved. The sequence of the building and duration of the sites further suggest
that there was not continuous expansion. The fortress of Sai belongs to the
earlpmid New I(ngdom phase, follor,ved by Soleb and Sedeinga (Amenhotep
III, reused by Tutankhamun), Sesebi (Akhenaten, reused by Sety I) and Amara
West (S.ty I to the late 20th Dynasty).
The nature of these "urban" centers themselves must also be considered
(Trigger 1985 : 348; Ilassan 1993; O'Connor 1993). In Nubia, as in Egypt, they
were limited in number and firnctioned as elite residential, administrative, and
cult centers rather than as residential centers for agricultural workers. Some were
also production centers and had artisan populations. F{owever, much of the
artisan production would have been for the state and the elite and not for "sale"
to the people cultivating the land. Other centers would have served as depots for
the supply of military installations. The system of temple-town economies pro-
posed by Tr igger (1965: r09),  I (emp (I972a; I972b: 66I,667; I97B),  and
Frandsen (1979) provides a model for the integration of the Nubian rowns and
hinterland, and also for the acculturation of the indigenous population. It should
be emphasize d that the "urban" centers in Nubia, which were limited to perhaps
half-a-dozen in Wawat and the same in I(ush, and which were not all occupied
at the same time , were elite centers. The majority ofthe popuiationwas dispersed
across the agricultural land, probably in the scattered ribbon-setdemenrs that
prevailed in the region until recendy. In sum, evidence from the towns of the
Abri-Delgo Reach suggests that th.y functioned as the main adminisrrarive
centers of the province of l(ush during the viceregal period.
What then was the nafure of Egyptian control in the 3rd-4th Cataract "fron-
tier zone" regionf There has been considerably less survey and, excavation in this
area. An Egyptian fortress is known to have existed somewhere in the region of
Gebel Barkal and the 4th Cataract. We know that this fortress was later called
Napata, but its exact location is uncertain. Several scholars have argued that
Napata served as the major viceregal center. F{owever, it seems extremely
- l I
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r,rnlikely that the principal administrative center wouid have been placed on the
southernmost fi'ontier, and evidence fiom further north contradicts this inter-
pretation. As discussed above, I have proposed that the 3rd-4th Cataract region
was left in the direct control of indigenous rulers u,ho received militarv support
for their regimes along with economic and other benefits. In return, they may
have been direcdy responsible for the acquisition and transmission of "luxury"
commodities, such as ivory and ebony, through trade with the central Sudanese
savanna. The tide "Overseer of the Southern Foreign Lands" held by the vice-
roys has been considered a "poetic variant" of the usual viceregal designation.
F{owever, other officials, who seem to constitute a homogeneous group, also
used the title. They include the viceroys, the Chief of Bowmen of I(ush (th. head
of the militia in Nubia), and others who are almost certainly I(usirite princes.
Significantly, the local rulers of Lower Nubia did not hold this tide. It thus seems
reasonable to conclude that it designated, quite specifically, control of the part
of I(ush that was not integrated as a province, but nonetheless owed allegiance
to the imperial administration. The role of the indigenous rulers in this region
is considered further beiow.
This modei presents the 3rd-4th Cataract as an imperial margin, with sym-
bolic frontiers at Gebel Barkal and the 4th Cataract (riverine routes) and at
I(urgus/Abu Hamed (desert routes). Arguing that the region between the 3rd
and 4th Cataracts was not fully integrated into the viceregal administration has
a number of important implications. First, it suggests that the Egyptian system
of temple-town economies was not introduced in this area and that locally pre-
vailing economies persisted. Second, there would not have been as widespread
acculruration of the non-elite population as appears to be found in the integrated
parts of Nubia. This in itself has significant implications for the succeeding post-
imperial phase, discussed below. Some archaeologicai support for this interpre-
tation now seems to be emerging. During ten vears of excavation in the De bba
Bend of the Dongola Reach, K. Grzl'mski and his team have identified no
Egyptian material and conclude that during the New I(ngdom this area was
inhabited by a non-Egyptianized indigenous population (Grzymski L997).
The locnl elites
There has been no major synthetic prosopography of the New lCngdom admin-
istration of Nubia in re cent years. The doctoral dissertations of Michel
Dewachter (L978) *d Ingeborg Mriller (1979) remain unpublished and any
attempt to assess the adminisuation of Nubia is thrown back on the original
srudy of Reisner (L920) and a mass of articles and excavation reports. Most
recently, Torgny Sdve-Soderbergh and Lana Troy ( 1991) have reasse ssed the evi-
dence for the indigenous princes of Lower Nubia in the New l(ngdorn. The
importance of these rulers to the viceregal administration had aiready been
emphasized by l(emp (1978), Frandsen (1979), O'Connor (in Trigger er nl.
l9B3), and others. While the role and importance of the princes is bevond
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doubt, there has been little studv of the remainder of the administration and the
role of other local elites.
Integration of the Nubian elite began early in the phase of imperial erpansion.
The children of rulers of Upper Nubia were sent to Egypt to be raised in the
palace from the reign of Thutmose II (+60-63) onwards. By the co-reign of
Hatshepsut and Thutmose III (+ 63-84) members of the ruling families of
Lor,ver Nubia had adopted Egyptian names in addition to their I(ushite ones, and
'vvere mployed within the provincial administration. This suggests that they too
had been educated at the Egyptian court from an even earlier date (perhaps
under Thutmose I, +49-60). The titles of local ruiers persisted into the later
18th and 19th Dynasties, but their names are purely Egypuan; indigenous names
have been dropped. The eiites buried in the main centers of Lower Nubia from
the same period all had Egyptian names and styles of burial. Lacking skeletal
material, it is hard to pi/lre that th"y were Nubians rather than Egyptian settlers.
The princes of Lower Nubia do not appear to have opposed the Egyptian
authorities, although our evidence is, of course, one-sided. Upper Nubia,
however, had proven more difficult to absorb. Initially the power of the I(erma
kingdom had to be broken, and there was constant "rebellion" in the first
centurv of Egyptian activity. Such factors may have 1ed the Egyptians ro use edu-
cation at the Egyptian court) gift, and military support, and to "allow" a degree
of autonomy, in order to maintain their authority in the 3rd-4th Cataract region.
The binding of the administration to the central governmenr was certainly
achieved through the distribution of "gift." A few texts record the installarion of
the viceroy and his first tour of duty accompanied by the royal envoys, on which
occasion he "rewarded" the local officials. Doubtless gr{t/reward was given on
other important royal occasions, such as accession and jubilee. Instances of indi-
vidual rer,vard are also known.
The binding of local elites through marriage to the Egyptian crown is a more
obscure issue. Despite the very clear instances of marriage berween pharaohs and
Asiatic princesses detailed in the Amarna archive, Egyptologists have generally
persisted in arguing that pharaohs did not marry Kushite women (e.g., Frandsen
L979 ). This stands in contrast to the claims of some earlier Egyptologists who
suggested, on the basis of superficial evidence, that some Great Royal Wives were
ofNubian origin (..g., Tiye and Nefertari). This ambivalent attitude is probably
best regarded as a residue from older prejudices. While direct posirive evid.ence
is laci<ing, there is a strong likelihood that pharaohs did marry I(ushite women.
It should also be noted that although Egyptian pharaohs married the daughters
of many Asiatic rulers, policy decreed that daughters of pharaohs were nor sent to
be wives of foreign rulers (Schulman L979). Requests for daughters of pharaoh
by the kings of Mitanni and Lssyrta/Babylon were apparently refused. This con-
tras$ with the Hittite policy by which daughters were given as wives to foreign
., . rulers or their heirs, with a contract to ensure that the Hittite princess would be
-* " chief wife and chief queen, and that her son would be eventual king (Schulman
1979). The effect was an expansion of the Hittite empire through blood.
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Another major tool in the binding of Eg,i'pt and the Nubian provinces 11,15
religion. The presence of Egypt in Nubia in the New l(ngdom is seen mosr obvi_
ousiv in the temple building of the late l8th and earlv 19th Dvnasties. yet the
very size and number of these edifices has in the past posed a probiem for hirto_
rians of Nubia, especialiy when allied with presumptions about the region,s
history' Earlier literature rarely regarded the temples as centers of religious belief.
Instead they were seen as massive structures of iimited fLnction, built to overawe
the indigenous population) or even to preside over a deserted no-man's 1and.
lVhile pe culiarly local features are apparent in the iconography and associations
ofthe kings in the Nubian temples (as is common in many other imperial conrex$,
see Alcock and Brumfiel, this volume ), tL. function of the temple s re flects curre nt
trends within Egypt itself. The development of Egyptian religion and particularly
of the royai cult in Nr,rbia is important because) most obviousiy, it informs on dre
ide ology that the Egyptians wished to impose on their d-epend,encies. It is also sig-
nificant when the later phases of I(ushite history are examined. The
"Egyptianization" ofthe Napatan and Meroitic periods (see below) has be en seen
as a residue of the years of occupation, gradually dissipated through rhe reasser-
tion ofindigenous phenomena. The importance of the Amun cult in the Meroitic
period is an obvious example of conrinuing Egyptian influence .
Habachi (1969), followed by Trigger (1976), IGmp (tg71), and others,
urged that the Nubian temples should be looked at within the broader contexr
of New I(ngdom Egypt and not in isolation. Habachi's (1969) fundamental
study of the deification of Ramesses II in Nubia showed it to be essentially the
same process as found throughout Egypt. Even so) the royal cult generalll, has
been interprete d as a manifestation of politicai power laclcing religious content
(Habachi 1969). Price (1934) critiqued similar attitudes in his discussion of the
relationship between religion and politics in interpretations of the Roman impe-
rial cult. H" (1984: 9-I0) did not deny the obvious political aspects of the impe-
rial cult, but emphasized that initiatives could come from belor,v, and need not
all be imposed by central authority. This can be paralleled in New Iqngdom
Nubia where private inscriptions invoke living and. d.ead rulers. The endowmenr
of royal cult images by members of the elite doubtless guaranteed presrige and,
may have had economic benefits, but discussions of these have tendecl to empha-
size the economic rather than religious aspects. As in Egypt, Roman imperial
cults did not endure long after the emperor's death. Deceased emperors an4 pha-
raohs joined the ranks of the gods, but the most potent form of cult was that of
the living ruler. The organrzation and exploitation of the Roman imperial cult
by local elites as detailed by Price has parallels with the pharaonic cult in Nubia.
Many members of the Nubian elite also held religious offices, whether of the
royal or of other cults. Female members of the elite, paricularly, were involved
in religion as chantresses, singers, and Chief of the F{arem oflocal deities. As in
Egypt itself, there was no church-state divide. Members of the same elite fam-
ilies held of-fices in civil, religious, and military institutions (Morkot Lg94: ch.
6). The ritual of Egyptian religion involved festivals focusing on a processional
"appearance" bv the god. \\4ren that god rvas also a manifestation of, or me rqe d
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ri,ir]r, the livins ruler, dtere must have been a further binding of the subject
people r,vith the dominant state and its ruler. Participation in these festivals, and
the gifts of food and other commodities that are associated. with them, musr
have served an important role in cementing the relationships berween rulers and
subjects.
The acculturation of Nubia's non-elite is more difficult to assess. Adams
J964: I07-B; 1977) and others, following Cecii Firth, proposed that after the
expansion of Egyptian power in Nubia in the early l8th Dynasry (+ 5-100) there
was a rapid recession, and because of hydraulic crisis a decline in the population,
throughout the later l8rh (+185-246) and 19rh (+246-,356) Dynasties.
Adams (1964:244-5) suggests that "by the end of the ISth Dynasry almost all
productive activity in the region had probably ceased." Flowever, the apparenr
disappearance of a large proportion of the indigenous popularion in the l8th
Dynasry (presumed to have been retreating into Upper Nubia) may in fact have
been due to a rapid acculturation and a reorganization of the agrarian e conomy
around the Egyptian towns. Adams (1964:106; L977:235-40) argues against
acculturation as a satisfactory explanation, but the evidence presented by Sdve-
Soderbergh and Troy (1991) suggests the contrary. The Scandinavian Ioint
Expedition found graves of relatively late New Kingdom date that continued
typical Nubian burial traditions but contained entirely Egyptian objects (Sdve-
Soderbergh 1967-8; Sdve-Soderbergh and Troy L99I). With the imposition of
a redistributive economy the products that were handed out, and therefore the
objects recovered, would have been typically E,gyptian in sr,vle. It remains diffi-
cult to assess to what extent the basic features of indigenous cultures may have
survived masked by Egyptian marerial cukure.
If we accept that the majority of Nubian officials were indigenes then we raise
a number of questions about what would have happened at the end of the New
Kingdom. Most signifi.candy, would th"y have attempted to carve out a separate
state for themselves) I turn to this issue below.
Econorny
The older view of Egyptian economic activity in Nubia was one of exploitation.
Egypt simply plundered Nubia of its resources - mineral (principally gold, but
also various stones), animal (ivory, hid.es, ostrich feathers), vegetable (ebony),
and human (as slaves). Kemp (L978), particularly, has argued that economic
exploitation was a prime motive in Egyptian imperial expansion. He quite rightly
stresses the investment by the E,gyptians in temple building, defense) and admin-
istration, ffid suggests that the reorganization of local economies around the
temples would have resulted in much of the 1ocal agricultural production being
consumed locally. As S. T. Smith (1991: B1-2) points out, other scholars from
vlrious backgrounds have also regarded economic exploitation as significant ro
imperialism. He suggests that the Egyptian presence in Nubia during the New
Kingdom mav therefore be seen as a manifestation of "Acculturation
Coionialism,, (Ig9I: 92-3\.
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The most recent discussions of the economy of Nubia during the Ner,v
I(ngdom (MorkotI995a; S. T. Smith 1995) do not reject I(emp's argumenrs,
but recognrze that there was both investment nnd, signifi.cant economic exploi-
tation. In Lower Nubia agriculturally productive land was always much more
limited than in the broad flood plain of Egypt. This would have dictated a rarher
dispersed setdement pattern. And even if the land was intensively cultivate d, its
agricultural potential was limited. Throughout historg Lower Nubia has never
supported much more than a subsistence agricultural economy, with the excep-
tion of date-production. Its importance to Egypt was as a source of vast mineral
weaith, notably the gold of the Eastern Desert.
Upper Nubia was more productive agriculturally. The results of a recent
survey have shown that the Nile flowed through three river channels in the
Dongola basin during the I(erma period (c.2000-1500 BCE). It is unknown
whether these still functioned in New ICngdom times. If they did, we will have
to reconsider the potential of the region as an arable producer. It is certain that
this was a major cattle-pasturing region during the New l(ngdom. I:[owever,
much of its importance must have been as the access route to the luxury com-
modities of the central Sudanese savarrna.
The model of an internal redistributive economy based to a considerable
extent upon the temple-towns argues against the simple plundering of Nubia's
resources. Land was held by the religious foundations and administrative offices
of the viceregal dominion; its produce was predominantly destined for the use
of people and institutions within Nubia.
While the evidence for an expanding population in Egypt and consequent set-
tlement of Egyptians in Nubia is inconclusive, there are indications of state-
controlled manipulation of the Nubian popuiation. Forcible removal of people
from Nubia and settlement of foreigners in the country is indicated by some
texts. F{owever, it is impossible to assess the frequency of such events and '.he
numbers involved, and consequently the total impact of such actions. These
transplantations, as paralleled in other ancient societies (notably the Late
Assyrian empire; see also D'Altroy, p. 216, I(uhrt, p. ll8, this volume) are
usually associated with military action. Although the evidence is at present prob-
lematic, it at least suggests that the Egyptians were not averse to the forcible
movement of population under certain circumstances.
I have argued (Morkotl995a: 178-80) that although there was a limited agri-
cultural potential in Nubia, a surprisingly large range of its products was none -
theless imported into Egypt. Among the most notable non-mineral products
were those of the date and dom palms. The sources limit our ability to quantift
the economic production accurately, but the few figures at our disposal suggest
that catde sent from Kush to Egypt (perhaps just to the temple of l(arnak) num-
bered about 300 per annum. This is three times the number sent from Wawat.
Wawat, however, produced about sixteen times more gold than I(ush.
There is no evidence for the rnethods of cross-frontier trade in ivory, ebony,
and the other "luxuries" of the central Sudan. It seems likely that the acquisidon
Egypt nrud Nub,ia 243
of these commodities was one of the chief responsibilities of the elite of I(ush.
There are no records of trading expeditions such as are known for the Old
Kngdom. llowever, the commodities appear as part of the regular annual
"tribute " svstem'
If the administration remained largely in the control of the indigenous elire,
so roo rhe internal economy of Nubia must have. I(emp (1978) has argued rhat,
given the ertensive investment of the Egyptians in temple buildirg, military
defense, and so on, Egyptian "imperialism" was not whoily exploitative. The
model of the re distributive economy also provides an explanation for the "dis,
appearance" of the C-Group population of Lower Nubia during the 18rh
Dynasty - as the range of locally produced artifacts was replaced by centrally sup-
plied goods.
The old idea of a decline in population and productivity throughout the New
Kingdom can be rejected as an incorrect interpretation of the evidence . It does,
however) seem clear that there was a substantial decline in gold production in
Lower Nubia by the 20th Dynasty and that the gold was almost worked out by
available methods (renewed gold production in the Ptolemaic period used dif-
ferent technology).Nevertheless, the Egyptians did not abandon Nubia as a
drain on their resources. It is clear that th.y regarded Nubia as an extension of
Eg,vpt and that other factors forced the withdrawal from the southern region,
perhaps in the reign of Ramesses IX or Ramesses XI.
Suw-trnery
The literarure on Egyptian Nubia underemphasizes the impact of time. Nubia in
the period of the Egyptian imperial expansion is not likely to have been the same
as Nubia after 300 years of Egyptian domination. I have proposed that the
Egyptian attitude to Nubra was fundamentally the same as that toward Asia, and
that consequendy Egyptian-Nubian interaction was different than often
assumed. With greater emphasis on the role of the indigenous elites, and a more
complex society and economy in Nubia, the rise of an indigenous successor state
is more easily explicable. Lower and perhaps parts of Upper Nubia had at the
end of the New ICngdom a developed state system with an organi zed andtrained
bureaucracy, social and political hierarchies, military forces (formidable, appar-
ently), control of local resources, and agricultural subsistence. In addition, there
were ) certainly in Upper Nubia and probably still in Lower Nubia, local orga-
nized political entities - "chiefdoms" or "kingdoms" - that controlle d the luxury
trade of the central Sudan and had their own military forces.
The model argued here would see a large part of Upper Nubia remaining
under the direct control of indigenous rulers throughout the New Kingdom and
therefore not Egyptiani zed, to the same degree as the rest of Nubia. Its rulers,
many raised at the Egyptian court) would have been Egyptianized and may have
*'--"'introduced 
elements of Egyptian culture and religion into their srares. But the
majority of the population) even ifit acquired some Egyptian objects, would have
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remained largely unaffected by Egyptian culture, language, and ideology. In this
model the "problem" of Egyptianization is reduce d. Following the end of the
viceregal period, Upper Nubia would not have "reverted" but simply continued
long-standing Kushite traditions.
THE I(USHITE DOMINATION OF EGYPT (Tr{E
E,GYPTIAN 25TH DYNASTY) , c.750-650 B CE
Th e tr nd'ition n linterpret nt'ion
As discussed above, the conventional view is that following the period of
Egyptian rule in the New Kingdom, Lower Nubia was abandoned for a consid-
erable period and the people of Upper Nubia reverted to a tribal or semi-
nomadic lifestyle. This state of affairs is argued to ha.ve continued until the
emergence of an indigenous chiefdom, later to become a "kingdom" in the mid-
ninth century BCE. This kingdom then rapidly expanded to control the central
Sudanese savanna berween the Atbara and Nile (the earlier archaeology of this
region is still barely known) and is divided into two historical phases: Napatan
(from the eighth century BCE to c.200 BCE) and Meroit ic. The Meroit ic
phase is largely coincident with the Ptolemaic and Roman periods in Egypt, con-
tinuing until about the mid-fourth century CE, when the state fragmented. Its
three successors became the three Christian kingdoms of medieval Nubia. The
king-list (largely compiled from tomb material) and the few "historical facts" of
the Napatan-Meroitic kingdom probably mask a series of dynasties and fragmen-
tations of the state. Throughout the Napatan-Meroitic periods the rulers (male
and female) continued to use E,gyptian pharaonic sryles of tide and regalia, com-
bined with some indigenous forms. Egyptian gods continued to be worshipped
and the Egyptian hieroglyphic script was used for official texts.
F{owever, this later Napatan phase is dismissed in much early literature : "much
of the Egyptian veneer disappeared . . . and the last pyramids and hieroglyphic
texts are almost a mockery of Egyptian culture" (Adams 1964: ll5). The sub-
sequent Meroitic period was similarly characterized as a firrther debasement: "it
was the Egyptiantzed kingdom of Napata running downhill to a miserable and
inglorious end . . . the last two or three centuries were ones of unrelieved degen-
eration and gloom when compared with the glories of the past" (A. J. Arkell
quoted in Adams 1964 I15). While this view of the Meroitic period has been
largely rejected in more recent literature, there is still a view that the Egyptian
elements of the culture are something of a "veneer. "
A reinterpretnt'ion.
The phase of Kushite domination of Egypt, in Egyptian terms the 25th Dynasry
lasted from about 750 /740 B C E until 656 B C E,, and thus forms the earlier part
of the "Napatan" kingdom. As the earliest phases of I(ushite expansion into
Egypt nnd. l{wbia 215
Egypt are still very obscure the initial date is somewhat arbirrar_v.The domina-
don can be divided into rhe follou,.ing phases:
I Kushite expansion into Upper Egypt, under kings I(ashta and piye, wirh
control only of upper Egypt (c.7s0/40-710 B cE)
2 Domination of the whole of Egypt with major residence at Memphis,
and increasing involvement in western Asia: reigns of Shabaqo and
Shebitqo (c.710-690 B cE) and Taharqo (690-664 B cE).
3 Assyrian invasions of Egypt, in the reigns of Taharqo and Tanwetamani.
Eventual ascendancy of Psamtik I of Sais; I(ushites still acknowledged in
Upper Egypt until 656 B CE.
A principai issue, which the literature has until recently largely ignored, is the
process of state formation in Nubia (I(ush; for recent discussions see Torok
1992 , 1995; Morko t 1994, I995b, L999 ,2000; T. I(end all L999). The I(ushite
expansion stands at the end ofwhat is generally rhought to have been a very rapid
process of state formation (e.g., T. I(endatl I982). Much of the scholarly litera-
ture (".g., Adams 1964, 1977; I(tchen 1973: 358; O'Connor in Trigger et nl.
1983: 242-3) begins with the I(ushite invasion of Egypt and continues from
there without any analysis of how the I(ushite stare came into being. As discussed
above , the conventionai view is that I(ush developed from an apparently modest
chiefdom (mid-ninth century BCE) to a srare with the milirary and economic
resources, and presumably the political homogeneity and hierarchies, to gain
control of a considerable part of Egypt. Further, ir was able to do this from a
homeland that is separated from Egypt proper by the sparsely (or un-)populated
divide of Lower Nubia. This characterization has developed largely o' th. basis
of the archaeological material. George Reisner excavated, a cemerery at el-I(urru
that contained burials of some of the "25th Dynasty" pharaohs and others that
he interpreted as several generations of ancestors. This cemetery formed the
focus for all discussions of the emergence of the Kushite state and largely con-
tinues to do so (see heated controversy of T. I(end all 1999 and Tor 6k 1gg2,
1995)' While there has been very little archaeological work in other parts of
Upper Nubia that has recovered material that can be artributed to this phase, rhe
possibility that such might exist has generally not even been considered,.
ConsequentlS the literature emphasizes the archaeological and historical hiatus
and the sudden emergence of Kush "from a perple*irg historical void.,, (T.
Kendall L982:9).
Adams (1977) is one of the few archaeologists ro have characterized the
"Napatan" period as a "successor state ." Adams follows the historical theories of
Arnold Toynbee. He views the emergence of the I(urru kingdom as one of
Toynbe e 's "heroic ages" in which Nubia, Egypt's "external proletariat,',
becomes "a classic example of a successor state: a barbarian peopl. 
"rrrrming themande and the burdens of empire from the hands of their former overlords,,(Adams L977:244-5). I(ush undoubtedly should be seen as a successor srare)
but the difference berween this and. other successor stares is the 200 vears it took
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betlveen the coilapse of the colonial system and the supremaq/ of the "barbar-
ians." Unable to expiain this archaeologically, Adams (1977:247-8) was forced
to comment that "it took some time for the lesson of the pharaohs to sink in."
T. I(endall (1999) concentrated on the chronology of the Kurru cemetery and
did not consider the broader issues at all. Torok (1992,L995) also discussed ei-
Kurru, advocating a different reconstruction, but also focusing on ideologicai
factors. Yet any attempt to discuss the process of state formation must consider
ail of the bases: political (interaction of the social hierarchg geopolitical regions,
etc.), military, economic, and ideological.
In my r,vritings (Morkot 1995b ,1999), I have emphasized the importance of
a continuous tradition of kingship/rulership in l(ush that can be traced back to
the A-Group phase (pr"-3000 BCE). I argue that such a continuous tradition
(which was exploited by Egyptians during the New Kingdom) would have
resulted in the emergence of independent states and power holders soon after
the Egyptian withdrawal. In this context, the idea of regression to a tribal level
is not convincing. I suggest that conventional discussions of the "emergence" of
the Kushite state have been prejudiced by a number of factors. First, is the
emphasis on the archaeological material from the cemetery of el-Kurru. This has
led to the assumption that the rise and expansion of the state was under the direc-
tion of a single ruling dynasty - that buried at el-I(urru. There has been no con-
sideration of the possibility that the I(urru rulers may have taken over (by force,
marriage) or other methods) a state that was already rapidly developing.
Second, the confi-rsed chronology of the l(urru material has been ordered
within an accepted Egyptian chronology, resulting, in the most favored model
(T. Kendal f999), in a "gap." Torok (f995) and others have proposed length-
ening the chronology of the I(urru cemetery, and so almost closing the gap,
although there still remain many archaeological problems. There has been no
consideration of the emergence of the indigenous Kushite state by analogy with
other postimperial contexts. This again has been influenced by interpretations of
the archaeology of Nubia. Yet, in the later phases of Egyptian rule in Nubia) we
have indications of a powerful state somewhere in the southern part of the
domain (or across its frontier) which posed a threat - Irem. We also have evi-
dence for powerful elite families within the Nubian administration. It ts, nt the
rery least,possible that the Egyptian empire in Nubia did notvanish in a puff of
smoke , but withdrew in the face of rising indigenous powers.
I(wshite irnp er'inl exp a.ns'izn a,nd, contr o I
Our reconstructions of I(ushite expansion into Egypt are based largely on frag-
mentary data and assumptions. A stela fragment of ICng Kashta, excavated at
Elephantine, Egypt's southernmost town, indicates that he had adopted pha-
raonic style, and had advanced, presumably militarily; to the Egyptian frontier,
and into Upper Egypt. In Thebes, the I(ushite princess Amenirdis I was
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installed as heiress to the reigning God's Wife of Amun, Shepenwepet, at
Thebes. Earlier Egyptologists thought that it was l(ashta who had done this,
therebv gaining aci<nowledgment as ruler in the Thebaid. More recently, fol-
lowing the theory that the I(ushite succession passed from brother to brother,
it was proposed that Amenirdis was installed by her brother, Piye (I(itchen
L973: I5l). However, all other God's Wives were installed by their fathers, and
there is no evidence to suggest that Amenirdis was an exception. Neither is the
theory of brother-succession substantiated (Morkot 1999). The likelihood is
that I(ashta used the inviolable office - as it already had been - as a way of
har,rng Kushite authority in Thebes recogntzed (MorkotL99lb;L994: 330-64;
L999). Beyond this, nothing can be confidendy said about the Kushite occupa-
don of Upper Egypt.
The "Vctory Stela" of Piye (Lichtheim 1980: 66-84; Eide et al. 1994:
62-1L2, no.9) indicates that at the time of his campaign against Tefnaldrt of
Sais, Piye was acknowledged as ruler of Upper Egypt and had a military force
present there. One of the most illuminati^g of I(ushite historical texts is the so-
called "Sandstone Stela" of Piye (Eide et nl.1994 55-9, no. B), which predates
the much better known "Victory Stela." The sandstone stela certainly belongs
to a point early in the king's reign, perhaps year 4. It attributes the king's acces-
sion to Amun. Although it is not specifically stated, it is a reasonable surmise that,
following his accession, Piye had travelled to Egypt to ensure the continued
acknowledgement of l(ushite rule in Upper Egypt and particularly Thebes. The
Litrg tells us:
He to whom I say "You are
He to whom I say "You are
He to whom I say "Make a
appearance.
He to whom I say "Do not
make kbau-appearance.
a wer-chief," he shall be a wer-chief.
not a wer-chief," he shall not be a wer-chief.
khaw-appearance (as king)," h. shall make a khnw-
make khaa-appearance (as king)," he shall not
The inference from this must be that Piye either reappointed rulers or
appointed new rulers. It is necessary to distinguish between the wer-rulers and
those who make khau-appearance (i.e., neswt-I<rngs - "pharaohr"). This passage
clearly reflects the situation in Egypt at the time of the I(ushite invasions, in
which there were four neswt-Kngs who had adopted full pharaonic style with five-
fold titulary and the appropriate regalia. These are referred to in the later inscrip-
tion as the "rtra.eu.s-wearing" kings. There were other powerful local rulers,
mostly of Libyan origin and closely related to the kings who carried the Libyan
titles "chief" (wer) or "great chief" of the Ma. The broken stela does not name
any of these rulers, but the "Victory Stela" of Piye's 2Ist year records his defeat
of the Saite ruler Tefnakht and his allies, including many of the rulers of the
Delta. Piye's overlordship was again recognized by both neswt-l<rngs and wer-
chiefs. All except Tefnaldrt came in person and swore their oaths. Tefnakht swore
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his in the temple ofhis own ciryin the presence of a general and the Chief Lector
Priest sent by Piye. The text of the oath is preserved on the stela although it is
probably very abbreviate d. If not as lengthy as the Assyrian Vassal Treaties it con-
tains similar promises, notablv that Tefnaldet will abide by Piye's commands and
r,r,rll not make war on his own account.
Following Piye's death, his successor, Shabaqo) was again faced with the
expansion of the Saite kingdom under its ruler Bakenranef. The act of "rebel-
lion" at the change of ruler was common (almost usual, see D'Ntroy, p. 209; cf.
I(uhrt, p.94) and presumably reflects the termination of ueaties on the death of
one of the signatories. This pattern is already evident in the Amarna Letters of
the IBth Dynasry where Egypt's relations with Mitanni are renewed on the
death of rulers in either country and sealed by diplomatic marriage. Foilowing
his defeat of the Saites, Shabaqo's rule extended over the whole of Egypt, and
he appears to have ruled from Memphis. Shabaqo followed the policy of earlier
Libyan pharaohs and appointed a son as High Priest of Amun at Thebes. Unlike
his predecessors he did not install a daughter as there were already two heiresses
to the God's Wife of Amun) one his sister (Amenirdis I) and the other Piye's
daughter. There is evidence for the reallocation of some offices at Thebes,
although the precise dating is unciear; it may have occurred in the reign of
Shabaqo or of Shebitqo. The l(ushite I(elbasken was installed as Mayor of
Thebes and 4th Prophet of Amun. The Nakhtefmut family had held the latter
office for six generations. Later, both offices were granted to the family of
Monthuemhat, which had previously occupied the Vizierate. The Vizierate, in
turn, passed into the family of Nesipeqashuty.
While it is difficult to impose any form of "policy" on these changes in admin-
istrative office holders, it can be said that families that had controlled offices for
a considerable period had those offices removed. Even so, I(elbasken is the only
I(ushite known to have be en installed in a major non-religious office (as Mayor)
and although there were many l(ushites in Thebes, they do not generally seem
to have replaced the Theban elite. In the case of the Monthuemhat family, the
loss of the Vizierate a.ppea.rs to be a demotion, but we know from both Egyptian
and Assyrian sources that Monthuemhat remained the most powerfi"rl individual
in Upper Egypt. Monthuemhat also established a marriage alliance with the
I(ushite royal house; his third wife , Wedjarenes) was a granddaughter of Piye.
There is a strong likelihood that Shabaqo established marriage alliances with
Egyptian elite families. Although marriage between members of the I(ushite
royal family and the Egyptian elite are known, most Egyptologists have argued
that there were no such marriages with the Libyan dvnasts.
There is considerably less evidence for the methods of Kushite control of the
elite in north Egypt. One stela does record the marriage of a I(ushite princess
(probably a daughter of Shabaqo) and the northern Vizier, suggestitrg a policy
similar to that in Thebes. Following the defeat of Bakenranef, Shabaqo may have
appointed a Kushite governor in Sais, but the only direct evid.ence fbr this is thc
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epitome of M'anetho's historv. Elser,vhere, he probably re confirmed or replace d
rulers. Donation stelae from his reign record some of the same Chiefs and Great
Chiefs who had earlier paid homage to Piye.
Taharqo followed similar policies as his predecessors. His daughter was
installed as eventual successor to Shepenwepet II; a son was appointed as Second
Prophet of Amun at Thebes; Shabaqo's grandson succeeded as High Priest. His
policy toward the Libyan dynasts also appears to have been the same - despite
the considerable upheavals and changes of alliance during the Assyrian invasions.
Taharqo's successor, Tanwetamani, also confrontirg Assyrian invasions, adopted
the same pragmatic approach to the Libyan rulers, accepting their allegiance
r,vhen th.y came to pay fealty. The Assyrians) too) confirmed and reappointed
dynasts who had previously been loyal to the Kushites. They may also have
installed a newvassal, Nekau, in Sais. Later, when the dynasts reverted to I(ushite
allegiance, some were deported to Nineveh, and apparendy executed. One
Assyrian vassal, Psamtik, son of the ruler of Sais, was installed in his own fiefdom
and adopted an Assyrian name, Nabu -shezzi-banni.
Econoruy of the I(wshite enopire
The imperial expansion of Kush must have had enormous economic impact, but
the documentation is extremely scanty. The narrative of the Victory Steia of Piye
records that the wealth of conquered rulers and cities was accorded either to the
temple ofAmun in Thebes) to Amun Lord of Thrones of the Two Lands (which
rn'ight be the god's I(ushite temple)) or to the royal treasury. Piye received the
contents of the treasuries of several towns along with gifts ofjewelry, gold, semi-
precious stones, linen, and horses from the Libyan dynasts. The conclusion of
the text states that Piye returned with ships laden with silver, gold, copper, cloth-
ing, and the produce of Syria and aromatic woods. Some of this diverted wealth
was doubtless used for the support of the I(ushite army and officials in Egypt,
and some for the king's extensive building works in the temple ofAmun at Ge bel
Barkal.
Trading activities with western Asia were certainly important during l(ushite
rule in Egypt and may have been a significant factor in I(ushite expansion. Once
th.y had established themselves in Memphis, the Kushites presumably gained
some control of the old royal monopolies, including in papyrus and byssos (linen)
which were valuable exports at this time. The principal trad-ing partners were the
Levantine cities of Tyre , Sidon, Byblos, and Ashdod. Timber from the hinter-
land of the more northerly cities is recorded in the building inscriptions of
Taharqo, as is Asiatic copper. Exports from the I(ushite heardand included ivory
ebong and elephant-hides. These items can be found in the "tribure" of the Sea
Coast paid to Assyrian kings as early as the reigns ofAssurnasirpal II and Tiglath-
pileser III. Horses are another possible export (MorkotI99Ib, I995b; Heidorn
re94).
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Th e l(wsh'ite errnpire : sttnow-Lery
From the reign of Shabaqo (c.710-696 BCE), the I(ushites were ruling frorn
Memphis. How th.y controlle d their vast empire is not yet well understood. The
empire fell into four major regions. These were: (f ) Egypt, which was reason-
ably homogeneous; (2) Lower Nubia which, if not r,vithout population, prob-
ably had only a rather limited population; (3 ) the 3rd-4th Cataract, which was
fertile and fairly homogeneous; and (a) the central Sudan as far as present-dav
Khartoum, separated from the regions further north by the Bayuda Desert. If
we assume the 3rd-4th Cataract region to have been the original Kushite power-
base, then their imperial expansion was both northward (toward Egypt) and
south into the central Sudan.
There is still very litde information concerning how the Kushite rulers admin-
istered their home territories. We have only one reference to a Kushite prince
installed as "mayor" of a town. Administrative terms that do occur in texts are
of Egyptian origin (such as sepa.t,i.e., "nome"); however, itwould be rash atthis
point to assume that an Egyptian-sryle administrative system was imposed. We
are forced to conclude from this admittedly scanty material that the I{ushites
adopted the Egyptian system within Egypt. This entailed reconfirming most offi-
cials and their families in office, placing I(ushites only in positions that had fbr-
merly been occupied by members of the Libyan ruling houses. It is likely
that within l(ush a different system operated that had its origins within l(ushite
tradition.
In Egypt, the I(ushites appear to have followed the same policy as earlier
Libyan pharaohs in their relations with the elite. Under the Libyans, rhe High
Priest ofAmun had been a son) in the later phase the eldest son) of the reigning
pharaoh. The God's Wife of Amun was a daughter of the pharaoh, but her office
was inviolable and not all pharaohs installed a daughter as God's Wife or as her
heiress. The position of High Priest of Ptah at Memphis had also been held bv
a royal scion, but there is no direct evidence for a I(ushite occupant. The evi-
dence from Thebes suggests that local elite families continued to exercise power)
although there was some limited redistribution of offices. The Libyans had estab-
lished numerous marriage ailiances with the elite Theban families. There is less
evidence from other parts of Egypt, although the same situation may be
assumed. Some l(ushite-Theban alliillgsr are known and a royal daughter
married the Vizier of Lower Egypt. Marriages with the Libyan dynasts are, in my
opinion, also very likely. One wife of Shabaqo carried religious titles that are not
characteristic of a l(ushite queen but suggest that she was daughter of a Libyan
(Morkot L994: Appendix 6).
Following the Assyrian invasions and Kushite reconquests, Psamtik I of Sais
gained conuol of Lower Egypt. The I(ushites were still acknowledged as rulers
of Upper Egypt until Psamtik's 9th regnal year (also year 9 of the I(ushite king
Tanwetamani). The transfer of Thebe s and Upper Egypt from Kushite to Saite
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rule appears to have been efTected Cplomatically. Psamtik sent his young daugh-
ter Neitiqert to be rhe eventual successor to the Kushire God's Wife of Amun,
Shepenwepet II. The situation is thus similar to the initial I(ushite appearance in
Thebes. Both Shepenwepet II and the reig.ing I(ushite High Priest of Amun
were sull active some yea-rs later.
The Egyptian pharaohs of the New Kingdom had attempted to integrate local
elites in both Nubia and Asia. The Assyrians later followed a similar policy. In
both instances if a ruler was deposed, a member of the same fu^ily often replaced
lum. Indeed, one of the problems of the Late Assyrian empire derives directly
from this policy (see Liverani, this volume). Leaving local rulers in control
involved considerably iess expenditure, but was subject to the porenrial of rebel-
lion. Eventually a number of vassal kingdoms were converted into provinces
because of rebellion. In Egypt, the Libyan dynasts changed their allegiance
according to which power was the more imminent threat, Kushite or Assyrian.
The Egyptian empire in the New Kingdom nppears to have faced less rebellion
than the Assyrian empire and certainly lasted considerably longer. Important
factors may be that the Egyptian empire was far smaller than the Assyrian and
military troops could be more rapidly moved to rebellious areas. It is also pos-
sible that the E,gyptians interfered less with their vassal stares.
In sum, the evidence for some aspects of the themes under discussion is scanty.
F{owever, it seems reasonable to state that the l(ushites exploited already exist-
ing economic and power structures. They did not reor gantze the hierarchies, and
only occasionally appointed their own nominees. Those nominees usually occu-
pied powerful religious posts that had previously been the preserve of the Libyan
pharaohs.
In the economic realm, it is evident that during the phase of conquest consid-
erabie wealth (principally food) wal reallocated ro the temple of Amun at
Thebes. This temple was directly under I(ushite control. In addition. there is evi-
dence that large amounts of precious materials were sent to Kush. Skilled
workers were also sent to I(ush and the later years of the dynasty saw extensive
building works there. \Arith Kushite involvement in western Asia, a proportion
of the commodity trade no doubt also went directly to the Kushite homeland.
One question that inevitably emerges from this is to what extent was trad.e or
the economy a significant factor in I(ushite imperial expansion. Obviously,
numerous factors affected the emergence of the Kushite state. Until we have a
much greater knowledge of the history of the southern parts of the Kushite
kingdom, we are unable to assess the role of the social, economic, and. political
structures of that region and the ways th.y affected stare formation.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see why a l(ushite state would expand in the way
that it did and with the speed that it apparently did, if the economic circum-
stances of the eastern Mediterranean lands had not been influential.
